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Introduction
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)
evoked wide interest as it was set to reduce rural poverty and provide much needed
social security in rural areas. As recently as in 2009–10, India was home to 355 million
people living in poverty out of whom 278 million or 78 percent were in rural areas. The
argument to develop and implement strategies to reduce poverty by increasing pro-
ductive employment opportunities in rural areas is compelling. This review article on
the impact of MGNREGA on agriculture and rural labor markets is largely based on
the official sources of data and other studies made on different aspects of the scheme.
It is divided into five sections. This brief introduction is followed by the second sec-
tion, which describes the salient features of the scheme. The third section provides
a brief overview of implementation of MGNREGS in terms of employment, gender,
and social inclusion some aspects of “decent work,” wages earned, and poverty reduc-
tion. The fourth section draws the available evidence on the impact of MGNREGA
on rural labor markets with village level data. The last section brings together certain
observations that are relevant for further research and policy measures.
MGNREGA: Salient Features
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 came into force on February 2,
2006 and was implemented in phases. In the first phase, it was introduced in 200 of
the most backward districts. Beginning on April 1, 2007, the second phase included
another 130 districts. The third phase came in quick succession, and was launched on
September 28, 2007. It extended the Act to the remaining 285 districts. Since then the
MGNREG Scheme 1 has been in operation in all the 615 rural districts of India.
The MGNREGA is based on the twin principles of universality and self-selection.
First, it offers the legal right to work for those who demand it within a time frame
(15 days of applying for work) at a specified minimum wage. Second, the universal
nature of the program eliminates targeting errors. With a people-centered, demand
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driven architecture, completely different from the earlier rural employment programs,
MGNREGA is expected to augment the employment intensity in the otherwise
widespread underemployment conditions of rural India. The process of implementa-
tion involves undertaking rural resource development without engaging contractors
and machinery, which is carried on by the Panchayat and community in the form of
planning and social audit. It is expected to improve participation, transparency and
accountability and reduce, if not eliminate, corruption and malpractices associated with
the earlier public works programs.
Special emphasis is placed on providing employment to women and a provision
is made for developing land and water resources on the private lands of households
of Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), Below Poverty Line (BPL), Indira
Awas Yojana (IAY) housing beneficiaries and land reform (assigned lands) beneficiaries.
In June 2008, this provision was extended to small-marginal farmers working with a job
card under MGNREGS.
By ensuring regular work at minimum wages, importance was placed on “employ-
ment first, with growth as an outcome,” rather than vice-versa.1 The hope was that
“NREG has potential to lead the economy towards a labor-intensive growth path, espe-
cially in the light of low and declining growth rate of productive employment.”2 Also,
a decent livelihood through a “rights based approach” like MGNREGA is contingent
upon certain minimum social security in the absence of which many deserving may
remain disadvantage. The MGNREGA as designed is only a rudimentary right. If we
raise the question whether “the right to work” as enshrined in the MGNRGEA is a
“right to a job” or “right to employment,” the answer is quite clear. MGNREGA does
not guarantee a regular job. It only guarantees certain minimum days of work at an
assured minimum wage so as to enable the underemployed or unemployed workers
earn a certain minimum supplementary income to overcome deprivation or distress
migration. “The caution is that quality of employment and productivity of work are
critical in enhancing the content of any attempt towards right to work.”3
Implementation of MGNREGS: A Brief Overview
Social Dimension
We shall turn to social inclusion in terms of the share of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and
Scheduled Tribes (STs) households in the employment generated under MGNREGS.
The incidence of poverty among ST and SC households is disproportionately higher.
Even in 2009–10, against an overall rural poverty level of 34 percent, 47 percent of
STs, and 42 percent of SCs were poor. Hence, a real test of whether a social protection
scheme such as MGNREGS is reaching the right social group or not is analyzing the
share of SCs and STs in the employment created. Similarly, inclusion of rural women,
who have a major part in supporting livelihoods, would indicate reach to the deserv-
ing. Here an attempt is made to assess the inclusion of these social groups in relation
to their share in population, and in the case of women, in terms of thin work partici-
pation rates in different states. Table 1 shows SC households in the total person-days
of employment created under MGNREGS during last six years. The assessment of SC
household participation in theMGNREGS should also factor in the relative share of SC
population in each of the state. The proportion of SC population in the state total varies
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TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF SCs IN TOTAL PERSON DAYS OF MGNREGS EMPLOYMENT
Percentage of share of SCs in MGNREGS employment
State
Percentage of SC
population to total
population∗1 2006−07 2007−08 2008−09 2009−10 2010−11 2011−12
Andhra Pradesh 18.45 29.82 27.86 25.85 25.03 24.25 26.99
Arunachal Pradesh 0.34 0 − 0 − 0 0
Assam 6.71 8.65 6.85 6.56 8.44 5.90 5.55
Bihar 16.39 47.08 47.59 51.83 48.25 24.40 24.57
Chhattisgarh 11.41 12.01 13.13 13.91 13.75 10.03 9.63
Gujarat 6.87 7.04 6.19 10.64 11.72 9.17 7.85
Haryana 21.36 60.03 65.37 69.18 58.28 54.05 49.68
Himachal Pradesh 25.59 30.40 24.54 29.03 27.28 29.99 30.08
Jammu and Kashmir 8.34 5.42 4.93 5.90 4.85 4.38 7.36
Jharkhand 12.35 23.48 20.83 18.65 16.49 12.29 12.75
Karnataka 18.39 33.05 30.48 31.14 19.15 17.21 15.70
Kerala 10.83 20.12 16.84 18.74 16.76 15.15 14.32
Madhya Pradesh 15.70 15.87 16.38 14.79 15.87 19.75 21.16
Maharashtra 10.93 16.19 19.41 18.46 22.94 6.12 5.80
Manipur 1.21 0 0 0 0 1.46 0.60
Meghalaya 0.38 0.29 0.46 0.59 1.01 0.73 0.65
Mizoram 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.13
Nagaland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.62
Orissa 17.19 23.65 23.12 19.11 17.72 18.64 17.50
Punjab 33.04 69.36 64.44 59.45 62.36 78.67 77.44
Rajasthan 17.88 15.97 15.06 12.78 12.08 18.27 16.76
Sikkim 4.96 0.83 6.88 2.56 1.07 4.45 4.55
Tamil Nadu 23.79 56.06 57.38 60.15 59.81 29.12 28.88
Tripura 17.17 15.92 18.20 18.36 14.55 16.84 17.99
Uttar Pradesh 23.38 56.85 57.53 57.35 56.13 33.12 31.55
Uttarakhand 19.91 26.70 25.71 24.36 22.42 18.60 18.34
West Bengal 25.79 36.08 35.11 37.20 35.85 33.85 33.74
All states 17.82 25.36 26.67 26.71 28.60 22.79 22.02
Source: ∗Census 2001 and http://www.nrega.nic.in.
from as low as 6.9 percent in Assam and 7.10 percent in Gujarat to as high as 28.9 per-
cent in Punjab, 24.7 percent in Himachal Pradesh, and 23.0 percent in West Bengal. For
the country as a whole, there was gradual increase in the share of SC households in
the total person-days of employment from 25.36 percent in 2006–07 to 30.49 percent in
2009–10 but later it decelerates. However, in all these years and in almost all the states
the SC share in employment is higher than their population share. This is expected
because most of the landless and land poor people in rural areas, who depend on wage
labor, belong to SC households.
The higher participation of SC households appears to happen at two ends of devel-
opment, with a kind of bi-polar tendency. On the one end, there are relatively better
developed states where most of the MGNREGS participants are SC households. States
belonging to this upper end of the pole include Punjab, Tamil Nadu andHaryana. States
belonging to the bottom end of the pole, namely, the relatively poor states where again
the share of SC households is higher, include Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. What this sug-
gests is that at both the ends of the spectrum, households suffer extreme exclusion. The
first level of assessment is their inclusion in wage employment. The second level may
be to assess the extent of benefits that flow to them through asset creation in their lands
specified under the MGNREGS, and this needs field level assessment.
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF STs IN THE TOTAL PERSON DAYS OF MGNREGS EMPLOYMENT
Percentage ST share in MGNREGS employment
State
Percentage of ST
population to total
population∗ 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
Andhra Pradesh 8.39 13.01 13.41 14.05 14.64 14.32 18.36
Arunachal Pradesh 70.51 100.00 − 100.00 − 97.95 100.00
Assam 13.55 46.26 49.14 46.90 42.96 19.25 22.82
Bihar 0.97 3.21 2.72 2.48 2.04 1.81 1.77
Chhattisgarh 37.63 45.55 43.46 44.99 44.34 31.26 37.56
Gujarat 21.63 64.26 64.44 60.52 55.86 37.38 40.26
Haryana 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.02
Himachal Pradesh 4.32 22.41 25.81 19.60 23.54 6.35 6.11
Jammu and Kashmir 13.83 23.22 26.62 28.22 30.45 11.32 14.98
Jharkhand 31.02 40.29 41.76 39.87 43.60 40.48 39.10
Karnataka 8.41 20.35 19.52 15.97 12.49 9.95 8.30
Kerala 1.48 12.40 17.30 14.05 14.07 2.92 2.37
Madhya Pradesh 25.35 48.64 51.84 51.85 52.14 28.84 27.42
Maharashtra 13.42 40.88 35.21 36.62 34.08 12.63 17.11
Manipur 41.09 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 26.49 70.70
Meghalaya 90.24 83.15 88.07 88.17 83.17 92.54 93.97
Mizoram 96.27 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.83 99.52
Nagaland 93.73 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 89.01 92.48
Orissa 24.61 49.27 41.65 39.53 42.73 31.72 38.17
Punjab 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0
Rajasthan 15.52 64.36 62.99 64.05 64.01 25.00 24.54
Sikkim 21.19 98.35 79.35 92.65 93.78 29.22 35.94
Tamil Nadu 1.58 2.37 2.84 2.17 2.45 1.27 1.28
Tripura 36.48 62.18 58.55 60.91 68.38 46.00 42.03
Uttar Pradesh 0.07 3.11 2.49 3.46 3.12 1.06 1.25
Uttarakhand 3.81 1.40 2.49 1.89 1.86 2.72 2.89
West Bengal 6.87 18.61 16.62 18.67 18.41 8.93 10.24
All states 10.63 36.45 32.78 31.94 27.19 15.31 18.25
Source: ∗Census 2001 and http://www.nrega.nic.in.
Table 2 shows the share of STs in the respective state population, and the share of ST
households in the employment created under MGNREGS in different states during the
last four years. What is striking is that the share of ST households in the total employ-
ment created starts off initially in 2006–07 at a disproportionately high level—more
than four times their population shareand then declines but is still at a relatively high
level. This is because the population share of ST in the 200 districts included in the first
phase was significantly high, and most of these ST households suffered from extreme
poverty. Hence, MGNREGS was a great succor as a livelihood provider. The higher
share is a positive inclusion and the latter decline in share may not mean any decline in
actual employment accessed by this group but increasing participation of other social
groups.
Why Women Prefer MGNREGA
Participation of women in MGNREGA is higher compared to any other government
program, even though there are several socio-cultural, economic, and locational factors
that affect women’s participation in work adversely. This is well reflected in the very
high share of female employment in the MGNRES in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Rajasthan,
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and Andhra Pradesh. Historically, there have been wide variations in the female work
participation rates across the country because of socio-cultural reasons. Female work
participation rates have been very high in Andhra Pradesh (48.3 percent), Tamil Nadu
(46.1 percent), Maharashtra (47.4 percent), Rajasthan (40.7 percent), Madhya Pradesh
(36.6 percent) and Himachal Pradesh (50.60 percent). The female work participation
rates are much lower than national average in Eastern India, Uttar Pradesh, and even
Kerala (25.6%). In a study of four states, Pankaj and Tankha4 examined the impact of
MGNREGS on women’s employment and found that women prefer to work under the
scheme because it is perceived as working for the government rather than for a private
farm or non-farm proprietors. Khera and Nayak also attributed their preference to
economic independence and ready cash income provided by the scheme.5
A study which covers Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Rajasthan, examines the rea-
sons behind wide variations in women’s participation across states, and finds that
women’s participation in MGNREGS is dependent upon several factors like the parity
in wages, role played by women’s organizations, traditional gender roles and child-care
facilities if the work is away from home.6 Table 3 shows that regardless of these cul-
tural differences, in most of the states women’s share in MGNREGS employment has
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE SHARE OFWOMEN IN TOTAL PERSON DAYS OF MGNREGS EMPLOYMENT
Percentage of women person days to total person days
State
Rural female
participation rate∗ 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
Andhra Pradesh 34.1 54.79 59.78 59.83 59.79 58.01 57.79
Arunachal Pradesh NA 30.02 − 32.20 − 34.59 41.18
Assam 9.1 31.67 34.92 36.94 37.83 24.66 24.92
Bihar 13.8 17.38 30.48 32.99 32.72 30.58 28.64
Chhattisgarh 4.7 39.32 42.63 46.36 46.69 48.02 45.25
Gujarat 42.7 50.18 47.51 46.83 47.17 43.21 45.23
Haryana 31.7 30.60 27.46 29.72 30.01 40.89 36.43
Himachal Pradesh 50.6 12.24 10.73 15.26 26.23 60.04 59.51
Jammu and Kashmir 26.7 4.46 0.70 0.85 1.89 17.92 17.72
Jharkhand 31.3 27.89 26.86 28.37 34.28 32.31 31.28
Karnataka 45.9 50.56 51.21 57.76 35.38 47.21 45.93
Kerala 25.6 65.63 70.95 83.86 86.99 92.56 92.85
Madhya Pradesh 36.6 43.24 44.44 45.23 46.22 42.67 42.65
Maharashtra 47.4 37.07 39.50 47.78 42.79 45.44 45.98
Manipur NA 50.89 0 60.66 35.01 42.69 33.46
Meghalaya NA 20.69 30.87 33.06 45.63 41.89 41.59
Mizoram NA 33.38 27.43 33.20 31.02 23.48 23.62
Nagaland NA 29.97 34.87 60.98 33.01 27.95 27.05
Orissa 32.2 35.60 38.33 40.67 40.40 38.39 38.65
Punjab 32.2 37.76 22.28 26.04 25.19 47.80 43.24
Rajasthan 40.7 67.14 69.89 68.92 67.70 69.50 69.17
Sikkim NA 24.79 39.86 33.23 38.84 47.83 44.76
Tamil Nadu 46.1 81.11 82.41 81.94 83.49 74.50 74.02
Tripura NA 75.00 43.35 54.80 35.20 41.74 38.65
Uttar Pradesh 24.0 16.55 16.45 20.67 24.39 18.84 17.13
Uttarakhand 42.7 30.47 46.42 52.02 57.89 43.89 44.59
West Bengal 17.8 18.28 17.81 27.72 33.98 33.02 32.44
All states 32.7 39.52 44.22 46.52 47.11 53.87 48.15
Source: ∗FWPR based on NSS 61st Round (2004–05) Usual Principal and Subsidiary Status and http://www.nrega.nic.in.
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been higher than work participation rates in these respective states. The exceptions are
Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh where women’s share in MGNREGS
work has been less than their overall work participation rates. Of course, Himachal
stands on a different footing because female work participation in the state is several–
fold higher than the other two states. Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and
West Bengal are the major states that did not fulfill the statutory requirement of pro-
viding at least 33 percent of the total employment to women underMGNREGS. Assam
also slipped below the norm during 2010–11 and 2011–12. Nagaland andMizoramwere
also under performers in the share of women in employment during the recent years.
While MGNREGS employment did break the barrier of cultural considerations against
women’s work since it is considered more dignified government work, there are other
factors like equal wages, which also means higher wages which need to be analyzed in
depth.
MGNREGS, Decent Work, and Worksite Facilities
Since MGNREGS is a statutory entitlement of work, it incorporates elements of pro-
visions that inculcate a culture of facilitating decent work. Here an attempt is made to
draw from a larger survey of three states—Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Bihar7—
the basic elements of “decent work” that are incorporated in MGNREGS, and the
extent which these are fulfilled. MGNREGS worksite facilities are thought of as part
of the provision of decent work. While awareness of these facilities enables workers
to demand them, actual provision depends on the administration. The provision or
lack of worksite facilities varies with the type of facility. Drinking water and first aid
were available to a large extent in Andhra Pradesh, and to a lesser extent in Bihar and
Rajasthan. These two facilities improved substantially in the one year between the two
surveys. There was less provision of shade at worksites. In Andhra Pradesh, the village
assistant kept sheets supplied for shade, for the stated reason that there were no proper
support frames for erecting them near worksites. In Rajasthan, the village assistants in
some areas explained that too much wind caused the sheets to fly off or break. The poor
record in providing crèches was partly explained by the fact that worksites only need
provide a crèche if five or more women with children below the age of six are working
there. The data in Table 4 is confined to sample worksites where the requisite number
of children were not there. Discussions with workers revealed that provision of crèches
was rare.
TABLE 4
AVAILABILITY OFWORKSITE FACILITIES (PERCENTAGE)
Item Andhra Pradesh Bihar Rajasthan
Drinking water 96.3 87.1 91.3
First aid 64.8 35.5 34.8
Shade 13.2 3.2 17.4
Crèche 0 0 4.4
Source:Worksite survey.
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Workers’ Wellbeing and Safety
In all three states, workers received an hour’s break for lunch in between their work-
ing hours. In Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, there was a state-sanctioned weekly day
off; for instance, in Rajasthan all MGNREGS worksites were closed on Thursdays.
MGNREGS requires the provision of tools and instruments for work, but in many
instances, especially in Bihar, workers had to bring their own tools, which prevented
many from participating in work. In Andhra Pradesh, workers were given tools but
not in adequate numbers. Non-supply of tools was compensated for by adding an
additional allowance of Rs. 2 per person day of work. There was also dissatisfaction
expressed at certain worksites that the tools given were not the right ones. Regardless
of local conditions and the nature of work, tools were procured at district level and
distributed across panchayats.
There were some reported instances of injury to workers at worksites in all three
states; free medical aid was provided. The Act provides that if any worker is per-
manently disabled or dies at the worksite, his/her relatives may receive an ex-gratia
payment of Rs. 25,000. However, this amount was not received by the worker’s family
in one such case that came to light in Rajasthan.
Nature and Duration of Work
Workers described work under the scheme variously as “very difficult” or “moder-
ately difficult.” Furthermore, average daily hours worked were the longest in Bihar
(eight hours), whereas in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan the daily average was six.
It was observed during fieldwork that in both Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, govern-
ment notifications had been issued for reduced hours of work during the hot summer
months. In Rajasthan, as per state notification, in the month of June when fieldwork
was carried out, MGNREGS work was officially meant to be carried on between 6 am
and 10 am so that workers would avoid the worst of the heat. There were similar
changes in the work schedule in Andhra Pradesh, where there was only one long session
before noon.
MGNREGS and Fixation of Wages
The issue of wage rate for MGNREGS has been a subject of controversy because it is
not fixed as a uniform daily wage rate applicable to all states. Nor is it linked to statu-
tory minimum wages, which vary from State to State. Except in Himachal Pradesh,
MGNREGS wages are paid in terms of piece rate linked to the “Standard Schedule of
Rates” (SSRs) of the public works Departments of different State governments which
bring-in the issues of fairness of rates, fair timely measurement, among others. One of
the basic principles that is followed is that of equal wages to male and female workers.
When the Scheme was launched in 2006, an indicative wage rate of Rs. 80 per person-
day was proposed. This meant that workers engaged under MGNREGS would be
assigned physically measurable work equivalent to Rs. 80 as per the Standard Schedule
of Rates. Later, in 2009 the indicative wage was raised to Rs. 100 per person-day.
Furthermore, it was agreed to revise the base wage rate of Rs. 100 indexed on the basis
of inflation rate.
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An attempt is made here to assess the wage rates across the States over the years.
Table 5 presents the average wage rate per person day for the last six years across the
States. The average wage rates are derived by dividing the total wage expenditure in the
state by the person days of employment provided in the state in the year concerned. The
derived wage rate per se may not be adequate to conclude whether the concerned state
is doing better or worse in terms of supplementing the earnings of rural households
through the Scheme. A better indicator is the total earnings per household under the
scheme, which depends not only on the wage level but also the number of days of
employment provided in the concerned year. In almost all States there has been rise
in money wage rates. However, given the fact that there has been a very high rate of
inflation during these years, it would be more appropriate to examine whether there
has been any improvement in real wages realized under the Scheme by deflating the
TABLE 5
AVERAGEWAGES EARNED PER PERSON-DAY AND AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS PER HOUSEHOLD
UNDERMGNREGS DURING 2008–09 TO 2011–12
MGNREGS average level
of wages per day (Rs.)
Average level
of wages per
day (Rs.)
Average level
of wages per
day (Rs.)
Average level
of wages per
day (Rs.)
States 2006–07 2007–0848 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
Andhra Pradesh 86 83 83 92 100 101
Arunachal Pradesh 48 − 59 69 95 91
Assam 67 72 77 87 107 130
Bihar 70 70 85 98 101 133
Chhattisgarh 62 68 73 82 104 120
Gujarat 56 63 68 89 97 112
Haryana 97 115 120 151 169 180
Himachal Pradesh 69 71 99 110 127 123
Jammu and Kashmir 69 70 68 93 113 124
Jharkhand 79 82 90 98 103 120
Karnataka 67 72 81 86 144 189
Kerala 121 118 120 121 133 147
Madhya Pradesh 60 63 73 84 98 122
Maharashtra 104 84 75 94 134 165
Manipur 75 81 78 78 93 125
Meghalaya 73 88 70 79 100 114
Mizoram 94 102 109 104 116 116
Nagaland 66 100 81 103 103 118
Orissa 53 76 92 106 96 123
Punjab 94 100 111 124 130 145
Rajasthan 51 61 88 87 75 90
Sikkim 87 88 92 95 100 117
Tamil Nadu 80 78 80 72 82 92
Tripura 60 71 86 101 103 118
Uttar Pradesh 56 90 99 99 105 120
Uttarakhand 72 73 85 99 102 127
West Bengal 70 79 78 90 107 138
All states 64 74 84 90 100 117
Note: For 2006-07 and 2007-08 average wage rates per person-day refer to first phase districts only.
Source: (a) Kannan, K.P. and Varinder Jain “Implementation of NREGA Across Indian States: A Phase-wise Analysis”,
article presented at Final Workshop under CDS-ASSR Project on Monitoring the Implementation of Social Security for
theWorking Poor in India’s Informal Economy, (Thiruvananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies 2011); (b) http://
www.nrega.nic.in.
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FIGURE 1
MGNREGS NATIONAL AVERAGE MONEY AND REALWAGES PER PERSON DAY.
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Source: http://www.nrega.nic.in.
money wages by Consumer Price Index for Rural Labor. Such an exercise is done by
taking the national average wage rate per person-day during the past six years. The
results are presented in Figure 1. It is clear from the results that though money wage
rates have been rising over the years, the real wage rates have been virtually stagnant.
And but for the decision to index the MGNREGS wage rate to inflation there would
have been a steep decline in real wages.
Employment, Earning, and Impact on Poverty
The overall performance of the Scheme as a measure of social protection depends not
only on ensuring better wages but also on achieving the objective of ensuring that
more households are brought under the fold of hundred days of employment. There
is no state which could provide 100 days of employment even to 50 percent of the
participating households even in 2011–12. Tripura, Mizoram and Manipur are the
only states where at least one-third of the households get 100 days of employment.
Of the other five states which have reached more than ten percent, three are Nagaland,
Meghalaya, and Sikkim. Of the large States only Andhra Pradesh (17.8 percent) and
Maharashtra (11.3 percent) show hundred days of employment per household crossing
the two digit level.
The overall performance of providing employment under the Scheme shows a
tendency toward deceleration in recent years. The macro picture of the average person-
days of employment captured in Figure 2 shows a clear downward trend. An attempt is
made here to estimate the impact of the earnings under the MGNREGS. State-specific
estimates of annual earnings of participating households are derived by dividing the
total wage expenditure by the average person-days of employment per participating
household. Comparing the average household earnings from the Scheme with the state-
specific estimates of rural household poverty threshold expenditure would indicate the
possible extent of impact of the MGNREGS on rural poverty. Table 6 provides the
results of these estimates. For the country as a whole the earnings from the Scheme
are a little over 12 percent of the poverty threshold income. These results suggest that
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FIGURE 2
NATIONAL AVERAGE PERSON DAYS OF EMPLOYMENT PER HOUSEHOLD.
2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
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Employment per
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Source: http://www.nrega.nic.in.
in all those cases where the poverty gap is relatively low, there would have been sub-
stantial reduction in rural poverty. Perhaps the steep decline in rural poverty in Tripura
from 44.5 percent in 2004–05 to 19.8 percent in 2009–10 could be substantially due to
MGNREGS. The highest impact is seen in Tripura where the MGNREGS earnings are
as high as a little over 20 percent of the poverty threshold income. Mizoram is another
high performing state with a share as high as 19.4 percent. The performance of some
of the relatively backward states such as Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and
Rajasthan is better than the national average. However, Bihar still lags behind, which
is also reflected in a lack of decline in rural poverty which continued to be as high
(55 percent) in 2009-10 as it was in 2004–05.
MGNREGS and Rural Labor Markets
Evidence From Across the Country
The search for information on the impact of MGNREGS on agricultural labor markets
leads to some evidence on labor shortage, changes in wages, mechanization, peak season
adjustment of work, or adoption of MGNREGS calendar and migration. The available
information, however, is sketchy and uneven across the regions. The implementation
experiences also vary widely.8 Yet some broad trends could be discerned. With the
exception of a few well-endowed regions, the pre-existing labor market in agriculture
is characterized by surplus labor, low wages, high male-female wage differentials, and
non-implementation of statutory minimum wages. The introduction of MGNREGS,
with minimum and equal wages for male and female workers, did bring about not
only an increase in the overall agricultural wages but also reduction in the male-female
wage differentials. For instance, “wage increases were reported in a number of states
right from Punjab and Haryana to Gujarat to West Bengal. Even in tea gardens of
Silchar wage hikes are attributed to MGNREGS impact.”9 That higher wages in the
MGNREGS will divert workers from agriculture and create shortages of labor in agri-
culture is a theoretically valid proposition but the extent to which it will happen is
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TABLE 6
IMPACT OF MGNREGS ON RURAL POVERTY (2009–10)
States
Average earnings per
household under
MGNREGS (Rs.) 2009–10
Rural household poverty
threshold income
MGNREGS earnings as
percentage of poverty
threshold income
Andhra Pradesh 6032 41580 14.5
Arunachal Pradesh 1711 46420 3.7
Assam 2982 41500 7.2
Bihar 2687 39336 6.8
Chhattisgarh 4228 37038 11.4
Gujarat 3272 43500 7.5
Haryana 5695 47496 12.0
Himachal Pradesh 6276 42480 14.8
Jammu and Kashmir 3573 43374 8.2
Jharkhand 4834 36398 13.1
Karnataka 4874 37764 12.9
Kerala 4284 46518 9.2
Madhya Pradesh 4659 37914 12.3
Maharashtra 4814 44622 10.8
Manipur 5681 52260 10.9
Meghalaya 3901 41214 9.5
Mizoram 9872 57000 19.4
Nagaland 8987 61008 14.7
Orissa 4196 34026 12.3
Punjab 3504 49800 7.0
Rajasthan 6027 45300 13.3
Sikkim 7625 43734 17.4
Tamil Nadu 3912 38340 10.2
Tripura 8028 39804 20.2
Uttar Pradesh 6458 39822 16.2
Uttarakhand 3455 43170 8.0
West Bengal 4029 38592 10.4
All India 4870 40368 12.1
Note: Average Earnings per Household under MGNREGS is derived by dividing the total wage expenditure by average
person days of employment per household. Calculated on the basis of the State specific poverty line threshold expenditure
for 2009–10 based on the Tendulkar Committee revision and assuming household as comprising five consumption units.
Source: (a) http://www.nrega.nic.in; (b) Upscportal.com for State Specific Poverty Lines.
an empirical question.10 This question assumes importance especially in the context
where still substantial underemployment does prevail in rural areas. In Maharashtra,
the earlier Employment Guarantee Scheme did put upward pressure on agricultural
wages but there was no clear-evidence of shortage of labor.11 In agriculturally well-
endowed regions, the level of agricultural wages was higher even before the launching
of MGNREGS, and peak season labor demand was met by seasonal migration of labor
from labor-surplus regions. The impact of MGNREGS on wages in such areas was not
much, except in pockets where the migrant labor flow declined.
There have been a number of reports on labor shortage not only in agriculture but
also in non-agricultural activities that depend on rural casual labor. There are reports
from many states like Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Tamil
Nadu that after the introduction of NREGA there has been a shortage of labor during
the harvesting of crops such as wheat and rice.12 Labor shortage is also reported during
peak paddy sowing season in Punjab13 and during apple harvesting season in Himachal
Pradesh.14 There are reports as to how with the shortage of labor, the bargaining power
of migrant labor in Punjab had increased to the extent of not only raising wages but
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also improving working conditions. One report reads: “Besides the TV, cooler, freshly
cooked food and accommodation, the laborers are nowwelcome to live in the houses of
farm-owners and not in some dilapidated tube well room out in the farm. Wages have
gone up three-fold. Farmers say seasonal wages have increased from a mere Rs. 700 to
Rs. 2,000 - Rs. 2,500 per acre, in just about two year.15” While farmers of these regions
tend to blame implementation of MGNREGS in labor surplus states such as Bihar,
Uttar Pradesh, and Jharkhand, the Commissioner of Punjab Agriculture has a different
explanation: “Earlier, the labor force used to come to Punjab sometime by March-
end, at the beginning of the harvesting season, and would stay put till paddy sowing
was complete by July-end. This assured them ample work for nearly four months.
But increased mechanization of farm operations, especially in wheat production, has
reduced the duration of employability for them and predictably of the workforce has
shown a dwindling trend since the past six years or so.”16
Agricultural Mechanization
There are also reports that labor shortage might be met by mechanization. “Farmers in
the Gangetic belt of U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] are reported to have resorted to mechanized
harvesting of the wheat crop in many villages.”17 The “use of combined harvesters for
paddy harvesting in Pondicherry is also attributed to labor shortage resulting from the
implementation of the MGNREGS.”18 The “Mechanization of sugarcane harvesting in
Maharashtra, and provision of heavy subsidies to harvesting machines are also shown
as a consequence of MGNREGS.”19 In Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka,
mechanization of paddy transplantation is promoted by providing subsidies on the
machines.20 Even in West Bengal there was resort to mechanization to beat rising labor
costs.21 An interesting report on the significant rise in the tractor market in India in
recent years cites shortage of agricultural labor as one of the explanations.22 There is a
danger that these reports could be read as if the MGNREGS is responsible for mecha-
nization of Indian agriculture. It is a fact that the introduction of combined harvesters,
sugarcane harvesting machines and paddy transplanters has long precededMGNREGS.
Some of these mechanization processes themselves, as observed by the Commissioner
of Agriculture of Punjab, previously cited, disturbed the stable stream of labor supply.
However, there is no gain saying that tightening of agricultural labor market along with
the state policy of subsidizing has been hastening agricultural mechanization, especially
in agriculturally better endowed regions.
Adoption of MGNREGS Work Calendar
One of the consistent and more sensible responses across the country is to manage
peak season agricultural labor demand by suspending MGNREGS work during peak
farming seasons of sowing, transplanting and harvesting. Such a measure would not
only help farmers avoid labor shortage but also would help workers get more days
of employment by way of peak season agricultural employment as well as lean sea-
son MGNREGS work. “There are instances of a number States where the Panchayats
were allowed, by mutual consent between farmers and agricultural workers, to work
with a calendar that avoids MGNREGS work in peak season and ensures it in the
lean season.”23 Such a calendar is desired even in the context of tea gardens in West
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Bengal, as one executive observed: “The Government would do well, and it would be
a win-win situation for all, if they keep MGNREGS work between November and
March when we do not need the workers. That way, even workers can make more
money.”24 The recent initiatives by the UnionMinistry of Agriculture and the Planning
Commission appear to be toward making such an MGNREGS calendar as an official
part of implementation.25
Migration
The MGNREGS, by ensuring work for hundred days at assured minimum wage at the
place of residence, is expected to have substantial impact on distress migration. Though
there are no studies yet estimating the extent of decline in distress migration as a result
of MGNREGS, there are a number of studies that gather impressions of participants
on the impact of MGNREGS on migration. The responses vary from state to state
and between districts within a State. The available responses from these surveys from
Uttarakhand26 Orissa,27Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,28 and Tamil Nadu29 show, by and
large, there has been decline in distress migration.
A study of select villages of Dhenkanal (Orissa), Bastar (Chattisgarh), Khunti, and
Gumla (Jharkhand) districts shows that “due to lack of employment opportunities
within the villages there was outmigration to agriculturally more advanced states like
Punjab and Haryana.”30 The marginal and small farmers depended mostly on wage
labor, with very little earnings from the low yields in agriculture. The commence-
ment of NREGA work has ensured not only employment in their native places, but
also afforded them an opportunity to save for investment in their farming, resulting in
higher yields. As a result, thoughmigration has not stopped entirely from these regions,
the incidence of seasonal outmigration has come down.
A study with a specific focus on the impact of MGNREGS on Scheduled Tribes in
Kandhamal and Koraput districts of Orissa shows that “the distress migration declined
by 72.5 percent among males, and by 45.5 percent among females. And also, the aver-
age duration of migration declined from 69 days to 23 days per worker.”31 However, a
study of Purulia and Jalpaiguri in West Bengal shows “marginal impact of MGNREGS
on distress migration, and the average number of days of migration declined by about
10 percent.”32 A study of five districts in Bihar finds that “there was not much of
incidence of migration in Siwan and Begusarai. And in Madhubani with an incidence
of as high as 50 percent migration, only 11 percent felt that there was any impact of
MGNREGS.”33
There are interesting instances of “return migration of marginal and small farm-
ers of Barmer district of Rajasthan who migrated to neighboring Gujarat, Punjab and
Haryana as wage-labor due to water scarcity and depletion of groundwater.”34 In
Barmer district, 47,779 tankas (small well-like structures made of concrete, cement, and
sand) and other water works were constructed under MGNREGS to collect rainwater,
thus improving the groundwater table and enabling crop cultivation. The improved
water supply has brought the farmers back to agriculture.
Of course, migration is not a linear phenomenon, nor is its outcomes binary like
good or bad. The impact would depend on the nature and context of migration. One
study shows that “improved irrigation facilities, soil conservation, increase in area
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cultivated and crop diversification resulting inmore employment, reducedmigration by
60 percent in Sidhi district of Madhya Pradesh.”35 Reports from Dungarpur, Udaipur
and Rajsamand districts of Rajasthan show that rural men continue to migrate to fac-
tory work in Mumbai, Udaipur and Gujarat. In all these cases the wages in these
activities are higher than that of MGNREGS, and the duration of employment is also
for longer periods.36 These can hardly be called distress migration. From these house-
holds while men migrate for high-wage and relatively long duration non-agricultural
work, women and elderly remain in the village to take to MGNREGS work, which
certainly is an addition to overall household income. But to call this as a “failure to
curb distress migration” is misleading.
That MGNREGS impacts distress migration is evident in the reports from non-farm
activities like textiles, jute mills, and large number of small and medium enterprises
(SMEs). The textile industry is dependent on migrant workers especially from Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa. As schemes such as MGNREGS provide livelihood to
workers nearer home, it discourages labor migration from catchment areas to produc-
tion centers. But this cannot be read as the cause for labor shortage but adds to the
difficulties in mobilizing “additional workforce” needed in this sector. The growth pro-
jections of the textile industry suggest that the workforce needs would increase from
the current level of about 35 million to 47 million by 2015. Most of the workers earning
about Rs. 7000 a month are migratory in nature. They move from the agricultural sector
to cities after the sowing season for half of the year, and get back to village when the har-
vest season starts. “The MGNREGS is seen as discouraging labor migration from rural
to urban areas.”37 But there is no evidence that migration for work that ensures higher
wages and longer duration was discouraged by MGNREGS. The Secretary General
of Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI) observes that “the problem in the
textile industry is not losing workers, but the industry is not getting additional work-
ers, especially skilled workers. The challenge will be to find enough workers and to
train them. Though the training needs are neither complicated nor time consuming, the
magnitude of the requirements would make it a herculean task.”38 Within the textile
industry, it is claimed that jute mills in West Bengal pay the maximum daily wages with
a fresher getting Rs. 227 per day and a skilled worker Rs. 404. These wages are two
to four times MGNREGS wages. Yet, it is claimed that shortage of labor in jute mills
is due to MGNREGS, which discourages workers to migrate.39 Similarly, the Indian
Industries Association (IIA), Ghaziabad Chapter also considers “MGNREGS as the
cause for labor shortage in small and medium industries.”40 But there is evidence from
field studies, as we shall see, that migration for high wage employment, especially male
members of the household has not declined due to MGNREGS.
MGNREGS and Rural Labor Market in A.P.
One of the major impacts of MGNREGS in rural Andhra Pradesh, as in many other
parts of the country, is on the labor market. Based on the reports of focus group discus-
sions (FGDs) spread over a fairly large number of villages (77), Table 7 presents some
broad indicators of the change in the rural labor market as a result of MGNREGS.41
These indicators have to be interpreted in all their nuances to the extent the FGDs could
capture them.
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TABLE 7
IMPACT OF MGNREGS ON RURAL LABORMARKET IN SELECT VILLAGES IN ANDHRA PRADESH 2008–09∗
Indicator Increased Decreased No change
No clear
response All villages
Agricultural wages 70 Nil 2 5 77
Peak season shortage of agricultural
labor
62 Nil 6 9 77
Male-female agricultural wage
differential
Nil 71 Nil 6 77
Migration (a+b) Nil 51 20 6 77
(a) Villages with migration before
NREGS
Nil 51 4 Nil 55
(b) Villages with no migration
before NREGS
Nil Nil 12 Nil 12
∗The evidence is based on reports of Focus Group Discussions (FGD) of 77 villages (panchayats) spread over 8 districts
(Chittoor, Nalgonda, Medak, Ranga Reddy, Adilabad, Karimnagar, and Kurnool). These FGD reports are part of the two
projects: Galab et.al. (2008) and Reddy et.al. 2010.
MGNREGS Minimum Wages
In the first phase of MGNREGS, the minimum wage fixed was Rs. 80 per day. It was
increased in Andhra Pradesh to Rs. 100 in 2009. As the MGNREGS wage is calculated
on the basis of work done at the schedule of rates, the minimum wage level is only
indicative and the wage level could be higher or lower depending on the turnover of
work. But in Kuppanagar, a village that is used as a case study, the average wage level
obtained has always been higher than the minimum indicated. Even in the earlier years
when the minimum wage was Rs. 80, Kuppanagar workers logged wages ranging from
Rs. 93 to Rs. 126. The results of the household survey show the average rate of Rs. 103 in
2009–10. In Kuppanagar, as in other places in the State, work is allotted to a group
calibrating the quantity equivalent to the schedule of rates that would fetch minimum
wage to each member. Often, some members of the group do not turn up but yet the
remaining ones complete the total allotted work, and this increases the average wage to
a level higher than indicated minimum wage. Wherever, the workers are formed into
Shrama Shakti Sangams (SSS), as in Kuppanagar, there is better motivation to work as a
team and complete the work allotted even if somemembers do not turn up. The result is
the average wage which is higher than the minimum wage. The average wages are paid
equally to men and women. The average MGNREGS wages logged by Kuppanagar
workers are higher than local agricultural wages, especially for women. The impact of
MGNREGSwages are felt in two ways. First, overall agricultural wages have increased.
Male wages in agriculture increased from Rs. 80 before MGNREGS to the present
level of Rs. 100, and female agricultural wages increased from Rs. 50 to Rs. 80. The
male-female wage gap has declined substantively. The hours of agricultural work also
has declined and it is invariably half a day work at the aforementioned wages. The net
impact on agriculture is higher wage costs.
The responses in the group discussion reveal an interesting pattern. Regardless of the
social group, most of theMGNREGSworkers are also small-marginal farmers and they
too feel the impact of rising agricultural wages on their farms but marginally, because
of two reasons. First, their earnings, especially those of women, from MGNREGS
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is substantial. Second, they have substantial gains by way of improved productiv-
ity of their land due to MGNREGS land development works on their private lands.
Therefore, the small-marginal farmers do not complain much about rising wages. The
landless workers acknowledge rising agricultural wages. Their main complaint is about
the steep rise in prices of essential commodities.
The response of relatively bigger farmers, normally non-participants in
MGNREGS, is about the rising agricultural wages. Interestingly, in many vil-
lages, they do not complain about the MGNREGS as such, since most of them
benefited from an increased water table in their wells and bore wells. This was due to
MGNREGS works, especially the de-silting of tanks and ponds and the construction
of a number of percolation tanks. These relatively bigger farmers have been repeatedly
making a plea that half of their agricultural work and wages could be shared under
MGNREGS. Paradoxically, they have developed a vested interest in MGNREGS
hoping their wage costs would be shared under the Scheme. And the political forces
appear to be nursing this hope!
Agricultural Wages
At the time of the fieldwork during 2008–09, the NREGS minimum wage for both
male and female workers was Rs. 80. In some of the villages in the State, the male
agricultural wage was equal or marginally more than the NREGS wage but the female
agricultural wage level was much lower in almost all the villages. The introduction of
NREGS increased the demand for labor in rural areas and resulted in an increase in
agricultural wages as well. The rise in female agricultural wages, which were at much
lower level, was much steeper than the rate of increase in male wages. As a result the
difference between male-female agricultural wages declined substantially in almost all
villages (71) for which information is available. An evaluation based on a large sample
drawn from nine districts of Andhra Pradesh shows 43 percent increase in wages since
the inception of the scheme up to 2010–11.42
The Andhra Pradesh experience of the high, average, and low performance at the
village level in MGNREGS employment, wage rates, and household earnings is highly
instructive and worthwhile presenting here as a summary statement.43 While the rela-
tively high average for the State as a whole could be attributed to State level political
and administrative commitment and initiatives, the high and the low observed at the
grassroots level could be seen substantially as a result of the presence or absence of
participatory governance at the Panchayat level.
Hunger and Food Insecurity
The experiences of Kuppanagar andMakkarajpet show what difference effective imple-
mentation ofMGNREGS could make to food insecurity in dryland areas. Whereas best
performing Kuppanagar may show that hunger is a thing of the past, in poor perform-
ing Makkarajpet 85 percent still feel that they have to suffer the privation (Table 8).
Whereas there has been improvement in the consumption of food and reduced food
insecurity, there has also been a growing concern about rising prices. There are interest-
ing instances reported in FGDs that reveal varying degrees of impact depending on the
local conditions and the performance of MGNREGS. For instance, the five villages in
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TABLE 8
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS UNDER HIGH, AVERAGE AND LOW
MGNREGS PERFORMANCE IN A.P. (2009–10)
Kuppanagar village (high)
Indicator
Sample
households
All
households State average
Makkarajpet
village (low)
Average person days of employment
per household
161∗ 84 65 31
Average wage per person day (Rs.) 103 110 92 86
Average annual MGNREGS earnings
per household (Rs.)
16,137 9,240 5,980 2,781
MGNREGS earnings as percentage of
poverty threshold income
(Tendulkar poverty line)
40.0 23.0 14.9 6.9
∗The high number of days is due to combining drought relief work with MGNREGS in the village during 2009–10.
Source: nrega.ap.gov.in and Household Sample Survey Reddy et al., 2011.
Karimnagar district report that MGNREGS had no impact on food insecurity, mean-
ing, Karimnagar, being an agriculturally prosperous district did have higher levels of
employment, wages, and levels of consumption of food; hence, MGNREGS did not
make any difference. At the same time there is Adilabad, a relatively backward district,
but here too, ironically, MGNREGS did not make much difference to food insecu-
rity. It is because of poor implementation of the MGNREGS in the district, no assured
employment, low earnings from the scheme, and continued migration, which together
perpetuate low levels of food consumption.
In contrast, in Khammam district, where there were villages with food deficit and
hunger before MGNREGS, reports show complete turnaround in food consumption
and security because of better implementation of MGNREGS, more employment,
earnings and access to food. In most of the villages besides improved consumption
levels in food, MGNREGS earnings have enabled the households to buy food in lump
sum quantities. There is also change in food habits and some households have reported
that they consume “tiffin” for the breakfast. A larger survey reports that a large pro-
portion of MGREGS households are able to buy chicken and meat (68 percent) and
vegetables (58 percent) and for 87 percent of these households MGREGS has become a
source of lean season employment. There are moving instances of livelihood dilemmas
of the poor, who before MGNREGS had incomes that were too meager to meet their
own consumption requirements. Therefore, they neglected the needs of the aged mem-
bers of the household. MGNREGS has enabled them to take better care of the aged
parents. Some households reported that they provide pocket money to parents to buy
toddy and beedis.
Shortage of Labor and Changes in Working Day
Even before MGNREGS, in peak agricultural season, labor shortage was experienced
in many villages. Of course, there were a few dry land villages where it was shortage
of work, rather than shortage of labor, that continued to be a problem. However, after
MGNREGS, 62 out of 68 villages reported an increase in labor shortage. However, out
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of 77 villages, only two villages reported a decline in the area under cultivation due to
a rise in wages or shortage of labor in the peak season. In Kuppanagar village, there has
actually been an increase in the area cultivated in the last two years, due to MGNREGS
investment in fallow and rain fed lands of SCs. A number of strategies are being adopted
to meet the changing labor market situation that in turn is also leading to many changes
in the nature of rural, and especially agricultural, labor markets. Six villages reported
labor being brought from outside the village by paying transport charges in addition
to wages. In three villages wages were paid in advance to ensure labor supply in the
peak season for agriculture. There has been growing tendency towards piece rate or
contracting out of agricultural work than employing labor on daily wages.
Agricultural workers reported better bargaining power, better treatment at the farm,
visible change in the form of respect, and less pressure at the workplace. In addition to
the rise in wages, in most of the villages workers have been able to negotiate reduced
duration of their agricultural working day. And, the growing shift toward piece rate
or contract work in agriculture facilitated the change in the working day. In parallel,
there has been an increasing tendency in the MGNREGS working day to begin early
in the day by seven in the morning and terminate by one in the afternoon. There is in
emergence, in some villages, a dual mode of work in a given day withMGNREGSwork
in the forenoon and agricultural work in the afternoon.44 The latter is mostly on one’s
own farms. Such adjustments appear to soften the shortages of agricultural labor. And,
the very working day is being redefined due to changes in the labor market brought
about by MGNREGS.
Group Work
There are important changes in the nature of work, duration of working hours, and
attitude to group work. Almost all work under MGNREGS is in the form of group
work. The workers in many places, such as in Kuppanagar, are organized into fixed
labor groups called Shramik Shakti Sangams (SSSs). The group formation, training to
“mates” of the groups and working together for over two years appears to promote
better awareness, solidarity, and motivation to perform better. The majority of groups,
with a few exceptions, are groups of mixed castes. There was considerable mutual
understanding and sharing of work. The reaction of workers to group work reveals
some of the finer elements of work, such as work not being looked uponmere drudgery
or exploitation but as a positive involvement. Worker’s response was that under group
work, which often involves the entire adult family members along with others, even
hard work is not felt as difficult work. There is a sense of mutual sharing when old peo-
ple and physically disabled are also part of the group, by making some stronger ones
compensate by taking more load but willing to share wages equally. In the perception
of workers, there is also certain amount of dignity associated with MGNREGS, since
it is government work, and there is no room for exploitation.
MGNREGS Calendar
Though there are reports elsewhere about mechanization of agriculture as a response to
labor shortage, there is no such perceptible change towards mechanization as a response
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to MGNREGS in the villages of the eight districts discussed here. However, there is a
widespread demand by farmers for stopping MGNREGS work during the agricultural
peak season. In fact, a number of Gram Panchayats have evolved, throughmutual nego-
tiation, work calendar that avoids MGNREGS work during the local agricultural peak
season. Such adjustment is seen as a mutually beneficial measure that helps farmers to
avoid labor shortage in the peak season, and workers to get NREGS work in the lean
season and thus increase the overall days of employment in a year.
Migration
Of the seventy-seven villages reported in Table 7, in twelve villages there was no migra-
tion before or after MGNREGS. Of the remaining, in four villages there was not much
change in the migration situation even after the scheme and in six other villages there
was no clarity in the information recorded. In the rest of the fifty-five villages, there
were varying degrees of decline in migration. Most of the decline is in distress migra-
tion, but not in the emerging process of movement towards higher paying, relatively
high productivity non-agricultural, and often, rural to urban mobility. At least four vil-
lages reported complete stoppage of distress migration. Some villages in districts such
as Ranga Reddy reported a decline in long distance distress migration to Mumbai and
Pune. In many other villages, the participants in discussions observed that there would
be further decline in distress migration if MGNREGS work is provided for longer
periods at a time, and if wages are paid without much delay. Their arguments were
well reasoned. They were conscious of the costs of migration including raising infor-
mal loans at high interest rates to meet the expenses of mobility, high rents, and fuel
costs in destinations, the ordeal of having to live in sub-human conditions and the risk
of their children missing a chance to go to school.
The non-distress type of migration from these villages, which is not affected much
by MGNREGS, is of three types. One is the migration of male members of the
households for high paying non-agricultural work for relatively longer durations. For
instance, from the villages of Kurnool district, which borders Karnataka, male members
of the households migrate to Bellary to work in construction, mining and other activ-
ities. The second type of non-distress migration that continues even after MGNREGS
is rural to rural migration from dry land areas to fertile areas for agricultural work.
For instance, from “Mandals” like Aspari in Kurnool district, entire household mem-
bers migrate to Guntur district during June-August to work in the mirch (chilli) and
tobacco fields where each migrating couple make as much as Rs. 500 per day. These
families return during September and October to their own villages to work in agricul-
ture, and some, even inMGNREGS. The third type of continuingmigration is—strictly
speaking not migration—daily commuting to neighboring towns. For instance, in
Kurnool district members of some rural households commute to neighboring towns
such as Allagadda to work in shops and other establishments where the wages are high.
Interestingly, some work in MGNREGS in their villages in the forenoon, and com-
mute in the afternoon to nearby towns to work in odd jobs including vegetable and
fruit vending. Another independent survey cutting across 81 villages in nine districts of
Andhra Pradesh reports 44 percent reduction in migration.45
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Additional Worker and Additional Employment Effect
A question often raised is if there were to be substantial increase in employment under
MGNREGS, what would be the impact on agriculture? Would there be shortage of
labor for agriculture? Or decline in the area cultivated due to shortage of labor? The
experience of Kuppanagar village suggests that though initially there were signs of
shortage of labor, over the past three years there have been interesting developments
in the working hours and the working day. Gradually, there has been shift in the daily
work schedule of MGNREGS works. It is increasingly now tending to be confined to
forenoon.With it, there is also a tendency on the part of workers who are engaged in the
forenoon to take up either agriculture wage labor or own farm work in the afternoon.
As observed earlier, many workers earn MGNREGS wages in the forenoon and also
earn on agriculture in the second half of the day, thereby doubling their day into two
working and earning days. This is hard work, but preferred by many workers as there is
substantial increase in income. This is a clear additional employment effect. The other
factor contributing to additional worker effect is the inducement of relatively higher
wages for women in MGNREGS compared to agriculture. Some women from certain
social groups, who did not perform wage labor, are participating in MGNREGS work.
Because it is “government” work, not work for a contractor or a landowner, the work
carries a social stigma in certain social communities. Thus, the additional employment
and additional worker effects together appear to keep labor supply to agriculture not
greatly disturbed.
Concluding Observations
MGNREGS, Labor Market, and Agriculture
There are clear evidences on the impact ofMGNREGS on agriculture and labor market.
The findings may be summarized into the following broad stylized facts:
• Agricultural wages have increased across the country, in which the impact of
MGNREGS is considerable.
• The rate of increase in the female agricultural wage has been much higher than male
wages, and the historically high male-female differentials in agricultural wages have
declined substantially.
• The tightening labor market has offered better bargaining power to agricultural
laborers, better treatment at the place of work, and the ability to negotiate the
duration of the working day.
• The terms of wages are increasingly tending toward piece rate contracts.
• The peak period labor shortages in agriculture are observed in several regions and
are resulting in changes in working hours, working day, and MGNREGS work
calendar.
• The ongoing process of agricultural mechanization is hastened especially in certain
operations like plowing and harvesting of paddy.
• A clear response to peak season agriculture labor shortage is the negotiated
MGNREGS calendar that avoids implementing works during agricultural peak
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and provides developmental works during lean season. Farmers as well as workers,
though not universally, welcome such a time schedule wherever it is adopted.
• There is no evidence that there has been marked decline in the area cultivated
either due to rise in agricultural wages or shortage of labor. On the contrary, there
are counteracting forces by way of “additional worker effect” by drawing espe-
cially women from certain social groups into the “government employment” of
MGNREGS wage-work; and “additional area effect” by making some of the fallow
lands of the poor more productive.
• There is clear evidence that rise in wages is one of the contributing factors, along
with other rising input costs, to increasing costs of cultivation. While SC, ST, and
other small-marginal farmers who are also participants in the MGNREGS were not
affected much, or in many cases gained considerably, the better off farmers could
face the rising costs partly through mechanization.
• The worst affected are the small-marginal farmers who are neither participants in
the MGNREGS work nor beneficiaries of works on their private lands. This sec-
tion of the small-marginal farming community may not be small, and face serious
crisis. In this context that the Planning Commission’s proposal to make the Scheme
more farmer-friendly by extending the coverage to some of the agricultural opera-
tions,46 if designed properly, may address the problems of excluded small-marginal
farmers.
• One of the salutary effects of MGNREGS on poor rural households is the drastic
reduction in distress migration. But there is no reason to share the apprehension,
as expressed by some,47 that the Scheme “may discourage them from moving to
more economically dynamic areas.” There is equally strong evidence to show that
migration for higher wage work that lasts for a relatively longer period in a year
remains unaffected. This type of migration might in fact improve if skill-formation
and capacity-building activities that improve human capabilities were also brought
under the MGNREGS.
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